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Conference on Semantics, Monterey, Calif.,
August 13-21, 1950

OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE [*]

Wilfrid Sellars

1. The phenomenology of language and meaning.

1.1 Language and thought are both directly related to the world.

1.11 Thus, thought is fundamentally awareness. To think of a state of affairs is to be aware of the state of affairs, not of an "idea" which "represents" it. To think of a quality is to be aware of the quality itself, not of an "idea" of the quality. To think of a particular is to be aware of the particular. These blunt statements would have to be sophisticated to take account of the difference between being aware of a particular or quality, and being aware of the sense of a description satisfied by the particular or quality, but nowhere would "representations" have to be interposed between thought and its subject-matter.

1.12 Similarly, the meanings of such linguistic expressions as can be said to have meanings are constituents of reality, and not "ideas" of constituents of reality. The sense or intension of "red" is the universal redness. The word "red" does not mean an "idea" of red.

1.13 Reality consists of all possible worlds.

1.131 The world is the possible world which includes this.

1.1311 Since the difference between the world and the other possible worlds is a pragmatic one (token-reflexives belonging to the subject-matter of pragmatics) rather than a logical one in the narrower sense, we shall avoid confusion if we speak of worlds instead of possible worlds. In the pragmatic sense of "exist" only the world exists.

1.132 Worlds come in families. To each family belongs a set of simple characteristics (qualities and relations), and each world of the family exhibits a set of uniformities involving these characteristics.

1.1321 These uniformities are the non-logical necessities (natural laws) of the family.

1.1322 A logician might say that each family is the subject-matter of a categorical set of postulates, of the sort that could be said to specify the laws of a family of worlds.

1.133 Logical necessities are uniformities which hold of all worlds.

1.134 A world consists of atomic states of affairs. These atomic states of affairs make up the Real State of the world.

1.1341 With the Real State of a world is to be contrasted the sets of possible states of affairs which, together with it, make up the set of possible states of that world. Each possible state is the sense of a State Description. The true State Description has the Real State as its sense.

1.1342 An atomic state of affairs consists of one (or more) simple particulars exemplifying a simple qualitative (or relational) universal.

1.1343 Just as each family of worlds is associated with a set of simple characteristics private to that family, so each world has its own private set of particulars. The worlds of a family exemplify the same characteristics, but no particular is common to two worlds.

1.13431 On the other hand, of course, one and the same particular may be common to two possible states of a world.

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1.2 A language exists as a system of norms and roles.

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1.221 The norms and roles making up a language are spoken about in a metalanguage. The formulation of a linguistic norm in its metalanguage is a rule.

1.2211 Corresponding to logical necessities in Reality, we have the logical norms of the language, and L-rules (Formation and Transformation rules) in the metalanguage. Corresponding to natural necessities we have the non-logical (physical, synthetic) norms of the language, and P-rules (Conformation rules) in the metalanguage. The non-logical norms of the language implicitly define the primitive predicates of the language, just as the logical norms implicitly define its logical terms and categories.

1.23 The roles which make up a language may be "played" by differing "materials". Thus, French, German, Turkish can be regarded as specifications of one system of norms and roles in terms of different qualities, relations, principles of composition, etc.

1.231 Thus we must distinguish between a word as a role in a pure system of norms and a word as a pattern of sounds, say, which plays this role in a "materialized" system of norms. Finally, of course, we must distinguish between a pattern of sounds as universal, and a particular realization of this pattern. Let us distinguish, then, between a word as type (role), as token-class and as token. In the case of linguistic expressions which are capable of truth and falsity, we distinguish in this way between propositions, sentences and statements.

1.24 Let us now consider the relation between a language and its subject-matter.

1.241 We shall so use the word "name" that only simples can be said to be named.

1.2411 A language contains names for all simple particulars which belong to the world or worlds which constitute its subject-matter.

1.2412 A language contains names for all simple characteristics which belong to the family or families of worlds within which its subject-matter falls.

1.2413 The phenomenological attitude no more presents us with gappy languages, than it presents us with gappy worlds.

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1.3 Let us next, continue the phenomenologist, introduce some considerations concerning metalanguages.

1.31 In the case of a syntactical metalanguage, the meanings constitute a system of norms and roles. The metalanguage itself is a "higher level" system of norms. In being aware of the meanings of a language other than a metalanguage, we are being aware of a system of states of affairs. In being aware of the meanings of a metalanguage we are being aware of a system of norms and roles.

1.311 But should we be startled at speaking of being aware of linguistic norms? We are aware of non-linguistic norms. Thus we are aware of moral obligations; And is not a moral obligation formulated by a rule in a language (though not a metalanguage)?

1.312 When we characterized a language as a system of norms, we did not stress what is now obvious, namely, that a norm is always a norm for doing, a rule is always a rule concerning doing.

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1.321 In the syntactical metalanguage we find rules which formulate norms and roles ingredient in the object language. Does the additional richness of a semantical metalanguage permit the formulation of additional norms constitutive of the object language? In view of the fact that rules are rules for doing, can there be "Truth Rules" and "Designation Rules"? Are there semantical rules in addition to syntactical rules? Perhaps "When aware of red say 'red'"? Of course there are syntactical rules in the metalanguage of a semantical metalanguage concerning the use of the words "true" and "designates".

1.322 How are we to understand the relation between a language and its subject-matter? Where in consists the aboutness? Two lines of thought seem open to us.

3.

(1) The "isomorphism" between the structure of roles and norms which is the language and the structure of particulars, universals, worlds and necessities is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of aboutness. Aboutness is the "isomorphism" we have described. (2) On the other hand, it occurs to us that surely the link between language and its meanings passes through the language user. We are tempted to think of awareness as the instrumentality whereby there comes to be a semantic relation between the language and its meanings. Perhaps it is awareness which brings it about that the system of norms and roles has these meanings for a language user.

1.3221 Yet does a system of roles and norms become a system of roles and norms for a language user merely by virtue of his being aware of it?

1.32211 More generally, is the relation between a norm and me whereby it is "binding" on me one of awareness?

1.32212 We shall clearly have to return to the subject of awareness.

1.3222 If the relation is isomorphism, then the relation between a name and its nominatum is a kind of equality. Examine the sentences of the semantic metalanguage of language L which follow:

A. 'a' (in L) designates a (in W)
where W is the world of L

B. 'f₁' (in L) designates f₁ (in F)
where F is the family to which L belongs

C. 'f₁a' is true (in L) \equiv F₁a is realized (in W)

We get an overwhelming impression as we examine these statements, and consider the totality of such statements, that a language, as we are conceiving it, is somehow a duplicate of its subject-matter. Indeed, if it were not for the normative character of a language, we might be tempted to identify it with its world. In this event, the semantic metalanguage of a language would consist in a series of statements of identity. Was it not Bradley who said that the Ideal of thought is to be Reality? For "thought" read "language".

1.32221 Notice that correctly formulated, a truth-equivalence reads

$$T('f_1a') \equiv R(f_1a)$$

not

$$T('f_1a') \equiv f_1a$$

One suspects that substitutions for 'f₁' and 'a' on the right hand side should be governed by the same considerations under which one would be willing to substitute for 'f₁' and 'a' within the quotation marks on the left hand side.

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1.4 A language contains a map of its world.

1.41 In mapping its world, a language maps the users of the language who belong to that world.

1.42 In using a language, a language user carries with him a map of a world.

1.43 The language user's map does not say that it is a map.

1.431 The language-user's meta-language says that its object language contains a map, but not that its map is the map.

1.44 Does not one find out which is the map, and where one is on this map, by virtue of being aware of the world?

4.

1.441 Is not to verify a proposition in a language, to be aware of the state of affairs which it designates. No. For in accordance with our opening remarks, we are aware of states of affairs in other worlds than the world.

1.442 We must distinguish between two senses of awareness (1) that in which we are aware of items in the domain of worlds, (2) that in which we are aware that this is the world. But of this more later. In the meantime, let us explore further the first sense of awareness.

1.5 We have assumed that one awareness (act of awareness) is indistinguishable from another, regardless of its object. Yet how can the awareness of a complex be the same sort of thing as the awareness of a simple?

1.51 Locke pointed out correctly (though in atrocious terminology) that simple relations terminate in simples. A simple awareness would have to be the awareness of a simple.

1.511 Besides, as we have seen, it is only in a derived sense that there "are" complex objects at all.

1.52 But what of the awareness of simples? Is the awareness of blue indistinguishable qua awareness from the awareness of red?

1.521 If awarenesses were indistinguishable, how could we learn to be aware of this rather than that?

1.5211 We would have to be aware by one act of what we were going to become aware of in another. Plato's Doctrine of Recollection and Aristotle's Active Intellect are just around the corner.

1.522 Acts of awareness, then, must differ with their object, must contain that which marks them as being about their objects.

1.52211 Awarenesses are mental symbol events or tokens. The relation aware of turns out to be identical with the relation of aboutness which relates language to its meanings.

1.53 Awareness (in the first sense) turns out to be the use of the very language whose meaningful use it was to explain.

1.532 To talk about awareness (in the first sense) is to use a semantical metalanguage.

1.6 We can now distinguish the second sense of awareness from the first. Let us speak of awareness₁ and awareness₂.

1.61 Awareness₁ is thinking of an object or state of affairs by having a mental token of the expression or sentence which designates that object or state of affairs.

1.611 We can be aware₁ of what might go on in any world. We can be aware₂ only of what is actually going on in this world.

1.612 Awareness₂ presupposes awareness₁. One isn't aware₂ of something unless one is thinking of it, and hence tokening an expression which refers to it.

1.6121 On the other hand, the something more involved cannot be defined in terms of awareness₁.

1.62 To be aware₂ of something, one must not only be thinking of it, it must be "present to" the thought.

1.621 To be aware₂ of something is to token an expression designating it, and for the item designated to be "present to" the token.

1.6211 To be aware₂ of a fact is to token the proposition whose sense is the corresponding state of affairs, and for the fact to be "present to" the token. Present to is the relation called "Coex" in my early papers, in particular "Realism and the New Way of Words."

1.63 To talk about awareness₂ is to use a pragmatic metalanguage. A pragmatic metalanguage includes a demantic metalanguage as a proper part, just a semantic metalanguage includes a syntactical metalanguage as a proper part.

1.631 One can talk in a pragmatic metalanguage about items being present to language users (minds) in many worlds.

1.6311 To talk about awareness₂ is not to be aware₂ of something.

1.632 To be aware₂ of something involves the use of a language, but it involves more than the use of a language. It involves something more than norm-conforming tokening. This something more is not norm-conforming. It is not a doing, but a

being confronted by the world. But of this more later.

1.7 The primitive symbols of a language, including primitive predicates and individual constants, find their materialization in basic token-classes, thus, to taken a tentative example, the shapes "red" and "bitter".

1.71 The language as a pure system of roles and norms consists of constructed roles and norms as well as primitive roles and norms. Two constructed expressions in a language may be logically equivalent. Thus 'Red & Bitter (x)' is L-equivalent to 'Red (x) & Bitter (x)'. The special quotation marks indicate that we are talking about the linguistic role which, in the first case, is played by the marks "Red & Bitter (x)"

1.711 Corresponding to the constructed type or role "Red & Bitter (x)" there will be in, say, the English materialization of the role, the constructed token-class "Red & Bitter (x)".

1.712 But there are among the norms of a language, and, in particular, among the specializations of the norms which constitute its materialization, as, say, English, norms which permit the replacement of certain constructed token-classes by defined token-classes. Thus, "Red & Bitter (x)" by "Ritter(x)", to coin an example, or, to take a familiar example, "Male & sibling (x)" by "brother (x)".

1.72 Thus, one may be aware of the "complex characteristic" brotherhood by having a mental token of either the token-class "brother" or the token-class "male & sibling".

1.73 By a simple token-class is meant a token-class which is not build (constructed) from other token-classes. A simple token-class is either a basic token-class or a defined token-class.

1.731 A complex token-class is a token-class which is not simple.

1.74 To be aware of something by means of a token of a simple token-class is to have a simple awareness. To be aware of something by means of a token of a complex token-class is to have a complex awareness. We could also speak of analysed and unanalysed awarenesses, taking them in the reverse order.

1.741 A crucial step in the phenomenology of phenomenology is to note that a simple awareness may be confused with the awareness of a simple. Here is the fons et origo of Gestalten.

1.7411 And of the paradox of analysis.

2. Phenomenology and empirical psychology.

2.1 Phenomenology is the exhibition of the norms of a language or region of a language by painstakingly and explicitly describing the structure of what one is conscious of in thinking about the subject-matter of the language. It is the exhibition of the norms of a language by the use of that language.

2.11 Phenomenology is rule-governed behavior enjoyed. Science is rule-governed behavior on trial. Phenomenology is contemplation, science is adventure.

2.12 In the phenomenology of morals, one exhibits the norms of ethical language by a painstaking description of what one is conscious of in thinking about the subject-matter of this language.

2.121 Thus, phenomenology corresponds at the linguistic level to the careful and reflective make-believe conformity to non-linguistic norms. It corresponds to the serious play-acting of duty. * * *

2.22 A norm is formulated by a rule. Awareness of a norm, then, is tokening the rule. But what psychological account can be given of this?

2.222 Normative activity is activity in which the rule formulating the norm... enters as a causal factor.

2.2221 The struggle between the "higher" and the "lower" self is exactly the struggle between Reason (rules) and Desire (certain causal factors other than rules).

2.2222 The features of a rule-sentence which indicate that it formulates a norm (the occurrence in it of "ought", "it is correct to", "it is not correct to", and other expressions of this type) express its causal rule in shaping behavior.

2.22221 This explains our dis-satisfaction with accounts of norms which make oughtness into a quality or relation. (1.3221)

2.223 The tokening of a rule is the phenomenological given-ness of ought.

2.224 A rule is not the rule of a person unless it is causally operative in his activity. Here is the sound core of Kant's Autonomy.

2.22241 When we say "You ought..." we are attempting to instigate a form of rule governed activity, either by bringing it about that the person addressed acquires ("learns") the rule, or that its causal force in his behavior is strengthened.

2.22242 When we say "You know you ought..." we affirm our belief in a community of rules.

2.32 Behaviorism is both a methodology and a psychological thesis.

2.321 As a methodologist, the Behaviorist conceives his task to be the elaboration of a system of concepts and laws in terms of which the observable behavior of organisms can be predicted and controlled.

2.322 The concepts he employs must be connected (1) by definition, and, in general, by the devices of logic and mathematics, (2) by axioms (formulated in the meta-language by P-rules), and by any combination of (1) and (2), with concepts relating to observable behavior.

2.3221 In short, the concepts of psychology, according to the behaviorist, must be related by explicit and/or implicit definitions to concepts relating to observable behavior.

2.323 Formulated in this way, Behaviorism is a more elastic methodological conception than many Behaviorists would allow. A narrower behaviorism would insist on restricting psychological concepts to those explicitly definable in terms of observable behavior.

2.3231 The prejudice in favor of restricting scientific concepts to those explicitly definable in terms of observables rests on a mistaken theory of concepts relating to observables. It rests on the illusion that these concepts (words) gain their meaning as concepts by association with observables.

2.3232 The truth of the matter is that all words have conceptual meaning by virtue of their role in a system of rule-governed behavior. All conceptual meaning is, in the last analysis, implicit definition.

2.3233 What, then, do "observation words" have that other words do not? The answer is that in addition to their conceptual meaning, these words are related in a non-rule-governed manner to environmental and intraorganic sensory stimuli.

2.32331 The tie-up between rule-governed language and the world is not itself rule-governed. (1.632)

2.323311 Could there be a rule "When X token 'X'"? No. To take account of (be conscious of) in a rule governed way is to token. Consequently, living up to this supposed rule would presuppose the occurrence of the token to be accounted for in terms of the rule.

2.323312 On the other hand, there could be the rule "When X, write (or shout) 'X'", for while taking account of X involves the tokening of 'X' or a synonym, this token is not the one which the rule says to produce.

2.324 Observation words are words whereby the world and he himself are present to (1.621) the user of the language.

2.3241 One and the same kind of utterance may serve both a rule-governed function (play a role in a language) and be a conditioned response to an external or internal stimulus.

2.3242 Conditioned responses can be surprisingly subtle responses to varying stimulus conditions.

2.3243 Observation expressions are expressions which play this dual role.../The noise "Daddie" was a conditioned response before it became a word, and observation word.7

2.33 The methodological behaviorist avoids the hasty identification of his concepts with neuro-physiological concepts: Nothing is gained by such identification as far as the content of psychological theory is concerned.

2.331 Nevertheless, something can be gained by cautious attempts along these lines. An attempted identification of a concept in psychology with a constructible concept in neuro-physiology may lead to a fruitful revision of the primitive terms

and axioms of psychological theory.

2.3311 After all, the language of psychology must sometime dovetail in some way with the language of neuro-physiology.

2.332 Yet the acceptability of a theory to the psychologist must lie in its success in coping with observable behavior. If it doesn't do this, then no matter how translatable it is into neuro-physiology, it isn't psychology.

2.34 Behaviorism as a psychological thesis (as contrasted with methodology) is the denial of consciousness. This denial, however, has been much misunderstood.

2.341 To deny consciousness in the sense in which the Behaviorist denies it, is to reject the traditional epistemologist's apparatus of mental acts. It is to deny the ultimacy of cognitive consciousness.

2.342 The sober Behaviorist does not deny that organisms have color sensations, etc., nor does he assert that color sensations are explicitly definable in terms of overt behavior.

2.3421 What the Behaviorist does deny is that there is any consciousness...that which isn't a matter of a...complicated learned system of stimulus-response connections of the sort that I should analyse by means of the concept of rule-governed behavior.

2.34211 In short, cognitive activity is overt and covert rule-governed behavior tied to the world by conditioned responses.

2.343 The Behaviorist rejects awarenesses of universals, of propositions, intentional acts, judgments etc., conceived as they have been by traditional epistemology. In rejecting these mythological entities, the Behaviorist continues the tradition of Hume and Mill, but without their mistaken belief that the laws of learning can be formulated in terms of sensations and images.

2.511 The psychologist who talks about a particular form of rule-governed behavior, say the moral conduct of a certain subject, must talk both about the kind of conduct in question and about the symbol behavior causally involved in the production of that conduct. Thus, one is tempted to say that he must talk both the language of the rule which governs the conduct of the subject, and the semantic metalanguage which describes the relation of the rule language to the non-linguistic realm, and in particular to the kind of conduct governed by the rule.

2.5111 Yet this is a dangerously misleading way of putting it. For (1) the language (conceptual frame) in which the ethical rules of the subject are stated need not be the psychologist's object-language (nor be capable of being translated into it); the psychologist who describes the conduct of the subject describes the conduct in his own language.

2.51111 The psychologist describing a form of conduct need not experience ought. On the other hand, he will be conscious of logical and physical necessities in his subject-matter, and of correct and incorrect in his thinking (use of language).

2.5112(2) The semantic metalanguage of the subject need not be the semantic metalanguage of the psychologist.

2.5113 But (3) -- the most important reason of all -- it is a mistake to say that the psychologist talks in a semantic metalanguage at all. To talk a semantic metalanguage is to talk about a system of norms and its being about a world. To use a semantic meta-language is to be conscious of a language as a system of norms, of oughts. The psychologist is conscious of norms only in the statistical sense of this dangerously ambiguous word.

2.512 The psychologist, then, talks and thinks in his object-language, even when he is talking (thinking) about language behavior, even about, say, syntactical metalanguage behavior.

2.513 We must distinguish carefully between "speaking a metalanguage" in the sense of being conscious of a system of linguistic roles and norms. The latter activity is the phenomenology of language, if reflectively and contemplatively indulged in. It is then Pure Semiotic.

2.514 The "idealization" involved in "constructing semantic systems" does not consist in supposin' that people talked in uniform ways, and formulating the empirical psychology of such a happy world. It is the "idealization" involved in the consciousness of a system of norms...

2.5141 This "idealization" admits of causal analysis by the psychologist, who will speak his object-language. The "idealization" consists in speaking a metalanguage. There is no contradiction, therefore in the idea of speaking about a metalanguage in an object-language.

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3.4211 An assertion is a tokening of a sentence. To assert that p is to token a sentence designating p.

3.4211 An assertion is not an attitude which is capable of expression; it is not an attitude which is incapable of expression. It is not an attitude.

3.422 Legend has it that a mere utterance of a proposition is saying something like "Mary baking pies now", where as to assert a proposition is to say something like "Mary is baking pies now".

3.4221 But the truth of the matter is that "Mary baking pies now" is not a Milquetoastly uttered proposition at all, but rather a part of such sentences as "Mary baking pies now is actual (belongs to RS)", "Mary baking pies now is a complex state of affairs." Such sentences are in their very essence right hand sentences in a semantic metalanguage, and, therefore, are themselves parts of such sentences as

True ('Mary is baking pies now') \equiv Actual (Mary baking pies now)

Use-defined ('M is BPN') \equiv Complex-affairs (MBPN)

For further meditation on such sentences see 1.3222

3.4222 A belief manifests itself in assertions, emotions, actions. Degrees of belief can be characterized in terms of some ordering of the manifestations of beliefs. Readiness to wager at various odds is a commonly used principle.

3.4223 To believe p with intensity measure n is not the same as to think p probably to degree n. The former is to have a disposition of intensity measure n, one manifestation of which is to utter "p". The latter is to have a disposition (of some, unspecified, intensity measure) one manifestation of which is to utter "p is probable to degree n"...

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1.32211 More generally, is the relation between a norm and me whereby it is "binding" on me one of awareness?

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1.3222 If the relation is isomorphism, then the relation between a name and its nominatum is a kind of equality. Examine the sentences of the semantic metalanguage of language L which follow:

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where W is the world of L

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where F is the family to which L belongs

C. 'f₁a' is true (in L) \equiv F₁a is realized (in W)

We get an overwhelming impression as we examine these statements, and consider the totality of such statements, that a language, as we are conceiving it, is somehow a duplicate of its subject-matter. Indeed, if it were not for the normative character of a language, we might be tempted to identify it with its world. In this event, the semantic metalanguage of a language would consist in a series of statements of identity. Was it not Bradley who said that the Ideal of thought is to be Reality? For "thought" read "language".

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1.4 A language contains a map of its world.

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1.441 Is not to verify a proposition in a language, to be aware of the state of affairs which it designates. No. For in accordance with our opening remarks, we are aware of states of affairs in other worlds than the world.

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1.612 Awareness₂ presupposes awareness₁. One isn't aware₂ of something unless one is thinking of it, and hence tokening an expression which refers to it.

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1.63 To talk about awareness₂ is to use a pragmatic metalanguage. A pragmatic metalanguage includes a demantic metalanguage as a proper part, just a semantic metalanguage includes a syntactical metalanguage as a proper part.

1.631 One can talk in a pragmatic metalanguage about items being present to language users (minds) in many worlds.

1.6311 To talk about awareness₂ is not to be aware₂ of something.

1.632 To be aware₂ of something involves the use of a language, but it involves more than the use of a language. It involves something more than norm-conforming tokening. This something more is not norm-conforming. It is not a doing, but a

being confronted by the world. But of this more later.

1.7 The primitive symbols of a language, including primitive predicates and individual constants, find their materialization in basic token-classes, thus, to taken a tentative example, the shapes "red" and "bitter".

1.71 The language as a pure system of roles and norms consists of constructed roles and norms as well as primitive roles and norms. Two constructed expressions in a language may be logically equivalent. Thus 'Red & Bitter (x)' is L-equivalent to 'Red (x) & Bitter (x)'. The special quotation marks indicate that we are talking about the linguistic role which, in the first case, is played by the marks "Red & Bitter (x)"

1.711 Corresponding to the constructed type or role "Red & Bitter (x)" there will be in, say, the English materialization of the role, the constructed token-class "Red & Bitter (x)".

1.712 But there are among the norms of a language, and, in particular, among the specializations of the norms which constitute its materialization, as, say, English, norms which permit the replacement of certain constructed token-classes by defined token-classes. Thus, "Red & Bitter (x)" by "Ritter(x)", to coin an example, or, to take a familiar example, "Male & sibling (x)" by "brother (x)".

1.72 Thus, one may be aware of the "complex characteristic" brotherhood by having a mental token of either the token-class "brother" or the token-class "male & sibling".

1.73 By a simple token-class is meant a token-class which is not build (constructed) from other token-classes. A simple token-class is either a basic token-class or a defined token-class.

1.731 A complex token-class is a token-class which is not simple.

1.74 To be aware of something by means of a token of a simple token-class is to have a simple awareness. To be aware of something by means of a token of a complex token-class is to have a complex awareness. We could also speak of analysed and unanalysed awarenesses, taking them in the reverse order.

1.741 A crucial step in the phenomenology of phenomenology is to note that a simple awareness may be confused with the awareness of a simple. Here is the fons et origo of Gestalten.

1.7411 And of the paradox of analysis.

2. Phenomenology and empirical psychology.

211 Phenomenology is the exhibition of the norms of a language or region of a language by painstakingly and explicitly describing the structure of what one is conscious of in thinking about the subject-matter of the language. It is the exhibition of the norms of a language by the use of that language.

2.11 Phenomenology is rule-governed behavior enjoyed. Science is rule-governed behavior on trial. Phenomenology is contemplation, science is adventure.

2.12 In the phenomenology of morals, one exhibits the norms of ethical language by a painstaking description of what one is conscious of in thinking about the subject-matter of this language.

2.121 Thus, phenomenology corresponds at the linguistic level to the careful and reflective make-believe conformity to non-linguistic norms. It corresponds to the serious play-acting of duty. * * *

2.22 A norm is formulated by a rule. Awareness of a norm, then, is tokening the rule. But what psychological account can be given of this?

2.222 Normative activity is activity in which the rule formulating the norm... enters as a causal factor.

2.2221 The struggle between the "higher" and the "lower" self is exactly the struggle between Reason (rules) and Desire (certain causal factors other than rules).

2.2222 The features of a rule-sentence which indicate that it formulates a norm (the occurrence in it of "ought", "it is correct to", "it is not correct to", and other expressions of this type) express its causal rule in shaping behavior.

2.22221 This explains our dis-satisfaction with accounts of norms which make oughtness into a quality or relation. (1.3221)

2.223 The tokening of a rule is the phenomenological given-ness of ought.

2.224 A rule is not the rule of a person unless it is causally operative in his activity. Here is the sound core of Kant's Autonomy.

2.2241 When we say "You ought..." we are attempting to instigate a form of rule governed activity, either by bringing it about that the person addressed acquires ("learns") the rule, or that its causal force in his behavior is strengthened.

2.2242 When we say "You know you ought..." we affirm our belief in a community of rules.

2.32 Behaviorism is both a methodology and a psychological thesis.

2.321 As a methodologist, the Behaviorist conceives his task to be the elaboration of a system of concepts and laws in terms of which the observable behavior of organisms can be predicted and controlled.

2.322 The concepts he employs must be connected (1) by definition, and, in general, by the devices of logic and mathematics, (2) by axioms (formulated in the meta-language by P-rules), and by any combination of (1) and (2), with concepts relating to observable behavior.

2.3221 In short, the concepts of psychology, according to the behaviorist, must be related by explicit and/or implicit definitions to concepts relating to observable behavior.

2.323 Formulated in this way, Behaviorism is a more elastic methodological conception than many Behaviorists would allow. A narrower behaviorism would insist on restricting psychological concepts to those explicitly definable in terms of observable behavior.

2.3231 The prejudice in favor of restricting scientific concepts to those explicitly definable in terms of observables rests on a mistaken theory of concepts relating to observables. It rests on the illusion that these concepts (words) gain their meaning as concepts by association with observables.

2.3232 The truth of the matter is that all words have conceptual meaning by virtue of their role in a system of rule-governed behavior. All conceptual meaning is, in the last analysis, implicit definition.

2.3233 What, then, do "observation words" have that other words do not? The answer is that in addition to their conceptual meaning, these words are related in a non-rule-governed manner to environmental and intraorganic sensory stimuli.

2.32331 The tie-up between rule-governed language and the world is not itself rule-governed. (1.632)

2.323311 Could there be a rule "When X token 'X'"? No. To take account of (be conscious of) in a rule governed way is to token. Consequently, living up to this supposed rule would presuppose the occurrence of the token to be accounted for in terms of the rule.

2.323312 On the other hand, there could be the rule "When X, write (or shout) 'X'", for while taking account of X involves the tokening of 'X' or a synonym, this token is not the one which the rule says to produce.

2.324 Observation words are words whereby the world and he himself are present to (1.621) the user of the language.

2.3241 One and the same kind of utterance may serve both a rule-governed function (play a role in a language) and be a conditioned response to an external or internal stimulus.

2.3242 Conditioned responses can be surprisingly subtle responses to varying stimulus conditions.

2.3243 Observation expressions are expressions which play this dual role.../The noise "Daddie" was a conditioned response before it became a word, and observation word.⁷

2.33 The methodological behaviorist avoids the hasty identification of his concepts with neuro-physiological concepts: Nothing is gained by such identification as far as the content of psychological theory is concerned.

2.331 Nevertheless, something can be gained by cautious attempts along these lines. An attempted identification of a concept in psychology with a constructible concept in neuro-physiology may lead to a fruitful revision of the primitive terms

and axioms of psychological theory.

2.3311 After all, the language of psychology must sometime dovetail in some way with the language of neuro-physiology.

2.332 Yet the acceptability of a theory to the psychologist must lie in its success in coping with observable behavior. If it doesn't do this, then no matter how translatable it is into neuro-physiology, it isn't psychology.

2.34 Behaviorism as a psychological thesis (as contrasted with methodology) is the denial of consciousness. This denial, however, has been much misunderstood.

2.341 To deny consciousness in the sense in which the Behaviorist denies it, is to reject the traditional epistemologist's apparatus of mental acts. It is to deny the ultimacy of cognitive consciousness.

2.342 The sober Behaviorist does not deny that organisms have color sensations, etc., nor does he assert that color sensations are explicitly definable in terms of overt behavior.

2.3421 What the Behaviorist does deny is that there is any consciousness...that which isn't a matter of a...complicated learned system of stimulus-response connections of the sort that I should analyse by means of the concept of rule-governed behavior.

2.34211 In short, cognitive activity is overt and covert rule-governed behavior tied to the world by conditioned responses.

2.343 The Behaviorist rejects awarenesses of universals, of propositions, intentional acts, judgments etc., conceived as they have been by traditional epistemology. In rejecting these mythological entities, the Behaviorist continues the tradition of Hume and Mill, but without their mistaken belief that the laws of learning can be formulated in terms of sensations and images.

2.511 The psychologist who talks about a particular form of rule-governed behavior, say the moral conduct of a certain subject, must talk both about the kind of conduct in question and about the symbol behavior causally involved in the production of that conduct. Thus, one is tempted to say that he must talk both the language of the rule which governs the conduct of the subject, and the semantic metalanguage which describes the relation of the rule language to the non-linguistic realm, and in particular to the kind of conduct governed by the rule.

2.5111 Yet this is a dangerously misleading way of putting it. For (1) the language (conceptual frame) in which the ethical rules of the subject are stated need not be the psychologist's object-language (nor be capable of being translated into it); the psychologist who describes the conduct of the subject describes the conduct in his own language.

2.51111 The psychologist describing a form of conduct need not experience ought. On the other hand, he will be conscious of logical and physical necessities in his subject-matter, and of correct and incorrect in his thinking (use of language).

2.5112(2) The semantic metalanguage of the subject need not be the semantic metalanguage of the psychologist.

2.5113 But (3) -- the most important reason of all -- it is a mistake to say that the psychologist talks in a semantic metalanguage at all. To talk a semantic metalanguage is to talk about a system of norms and its being about a world. To use a semantic meta-language is to be conscious of a language as a system of norms, of oughts. The psychologist is conscious of norms only in the statistical sense of this dangerously ambiguous word.

2.512 The psychologist, then, talks and thinks in his object-language, even when he is talking (thinking) about language behavior, even about, say, syntactical metalanguage behavior.

2.513 We must distinguish carefully between "speaking a metalanguage" in the sense of being conscious of a system of linguistic roles and norms. The latter activity is the phenomenology of language, if reflectively and contemplatively indulged in. It is then Pure Semiotic.

2.514 The "idealization" involved in "constructing semantic systems" does not consist in supposin' that people talked in uniform ways, and formulating the empirical psychology of such a happy world. It is the "idealization" involved in the consciousness of a system of norms...

2.5141 This "idealization" admits of causal analysis by the psychologist, who will speak his object-language. The "idealization" consists in speaking a metalanguage. There is no contradiction, therefore in the idea of speaking about a metalanguage in an object-language.

* * *

3.4211 An assertion is a tokening of a sentence. To assert that p is to token a sentence designating p.

3.4211 An assertion is not an attitude which is capable of expression; it is not an attitude which is incapable of expression. It is not an attitude.

3.422 Legend has it that a mere utterance of a proposition is saying something like "Mary baking pies now", where as to assert a proposition is to say something like "Mary is baking pies now".

3.4221 But the truth of the matter is that "Mary baking pies now" is not a Milquetoastly uttered proposition at all, but rather a part of such sentences as "Mary baking pies now is actual (belongs to RS)", "Mary baking pies now is a complex state of affairs." Such sentences are in their very essence right hand sentences in a semantic metalanguage, and, therefore, are themselves parts of such sentences as

True ('Mary is baking pies now') \equiv Actual (Mary baking pies now)

Use-defined ('M is BPN') \equiv Complex-affairs (MBPN)

For further meditation on such sentences see 1.3222

3.4222 A belief manifests itself in assertions, emotions, actions. Degrees of belief can be characterized in terms of some ordering of the manifestations of beliefs. Readiness to wager at various odds is a commonly used principle.

3.4223 To believe p with intensity measure n is not the same as to think p probably to degree n. The former is to have a disposition of intensity measure n, one manifestation of which is to utter "p". The latter is to have a disposition (of some, unspecified, intensity measure) one manifestation of which is to utter "p is probable to degree n"...

The circulation of this draft is
restricted to members of the Rockefeller
Conference on Semantics, Monterey, Calif.,
August 13-21, 1950

OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE [*]

Wilfrid Sellars

1. The phenomenology of language and meaning.

1.1 Language and thought are both directly related to the world.

1.11 Thus, thought is fundamentally awareness. To think of a state of affairs is to be aware of the state of affairs, not of an "idea" which "represents" it. To think of a quality is to be aware of the quality itself, not of an "idea" of the quality. To think of a particular is to be aware of the particular. These blunt statements would have to be sophisticated to take account of the difference between being aware of a particular or quality, and being aware of the sense of a description satisfied by the particular or quality, but nowhere would "representations" have to be interposed between thought and its subject-matter.

1.12 Similarly, the meanings of such linguistic expressions as can be said to have meanings are constituents of reality, and not "ideas" of constituents of reality. The sense or intension of "red" is the universal redness. The word "red" does not mean an "idea" of red.

1.13 Reality consists of all possible worlds.

1.131 The world is the possible world which includes this.

1.1311 Since the difference between the world and the other possible worlds is a pragmatic one (token-reflexives belonging to the subject-matter of pragmatics) rather than a logical one in the narrower sense, we shall avoid confusion if we speak of worlds instead of possible worlds. In the pragmatic sense of "exist" only the world exists.

1.132 Worlds come in families. To each family belongs a set of simple characteristics (qualities and relations), and each world of the family exhibits a set of uniformities involving these characteristics.

1.1321 These uniformities are the non-logical necessities (natural laws) of the family.

1.1322 A logician might say that each family is the subject-matter of a categorical set of postulates, of the sort that could be said to specify the laws of a family of worlds.

1.133 Logical necessities are uniformities which hold of all worlds.

1.134 A world consists of atomic states of affairs. These atomic states of affairs make up the Real State of the world.

1.1341 With the Real State of a world is to be contrasted the sets of possible states of affairs which, together with it, make up the set of possible states of that world. Each possible state is the sense of a State Description. The true State Description has the Real State as its sense.

1.1342 An atomic state of affairs consists of one (or more) simple particulars exemplifying a simple qualitative (or relational) universal.

1.1343 Just as each family of worlds is associated with a set of simple characteristics private to that family, so each world has its own private set of particulars. The worlds of a family exemplify the same characteristics, but no particular is common to two worlds.

1.13431 On the other hand, of course, one and the same particular may be common to two possible states of a world.

[*] This series of excerpts represents an attempt to salvage some of the more sensible ideas contained in the original. Much of what I have omitted is pretty crude stuff which reflects the speed with which it was written, though I have also omitted some material which might obscure the argument of these selections. 7

1.2 A language exists as a system of norms and roles.

* * *

1.221 The norms and roles making up a language are spoken about in a metalanguage. The formulation of a linguistic norm in its metalanguage is a rule.

1.2211 Corresponding to logical necessities in Reality, we have the logical norms of the language, and L-rules (Formation and Transformation rules) in the metalanguage. Corresponding to natural necessities we have the non-logical (physical, synthetic) norms of the language, and P-rules (Conformation rules) in the metalanguage. The non-logical norms of the language implicitly define the primitive predicates of the language, just as the logical norms implicitly define its logical terms and categories.

1.23 The roles which make up a language may be "played" by differing "materials". Thus, French, German, Turkish can be regarded as specifications of one system of norms and roles in terms of different qualities, relations, principles of composition, etc.

1.231 Thus we must distinguish between a word as a role in a pure system of norms and a word as a pattern of sounds, say, which plays this role in a "materialized" system of norms. Finally, of course, we must distinguish between a pattern of sounds as universal, and a particular realization of this pattern. Let us distinguish, then, between a word as type (role), as token-class and as token. In the case of linguistic expressions which are capable of truth and falsity, we distinguish in this way between propositions, sentences and statements.

1.24 Let us now consider the relation between a language and its subject-matter.

1.241 We shall so use the word "name" that only simples can be said to be named.

1.2411 A language contains names for all simple particulars which belong to the world or worlds which constitute its subject-matter.

1.2412 A language contains names for all simple characteristics which belong to the family or families of worlds within which its subject-matter falls.

1.2413 The phenomenological attitude no more presents us with gappy languages, than it presents us with gappy worlds.

* * *

1.3 Let us next, continue the phenomenologist, introduce some considerations concerning metalanguages.

1.31 In the case of a syntactical metalanguage, the meanings constitute a system of norms and roles. The metalanguage itself is a "higher level" system of norms. In being aware of the meanings of a language other than a metalanguage, we are being aware of a system of states of affairs. In being aware of the meanings of a metalanguage we are being aware of a system of norms and roles.

1.311 But should we be startled at speaking of being aware of linguistic norms? We are aware of non-linguistic norms. Thus we are aware of moral obligations; And is not a moral obligation formulated by a rule in a language (though not a metalanguage)?

1.312 When we characterized a language as a system of norms, we did not stress what is now obvious, namely, that a norm is always a norm for doing, a rule is always a rule concerning doing.

* * *

1.321 In the syntactical metalanguage we find rules which formulate norms and roles ingredient in the object language. Does the additional richness of a semantical metalanguage permit the formulation of additional norms constitutive of the object language? In view of the fact that rules are rules for doing, can there be "Truth Rules" and "Designation Rules"? Are there semantical rules in addition to syntactical rules? Perhaps "When aware of red say 'red'"? Of course there are syntactical rules in the metalanguage of a semantical metalanguage concerning the use of the words "true" and "designates".

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1.621 To be aware₂ of something is to token an expression designating it, and for the item designated to be "present to" the token.

1.6211 To be aware₂ of a fact is to token the proposition whose sense is the corresponding state of affairs, and for the fact to be "present to" the token. Present to is the relation called "Coex" in my early papers, in particular "Realism and the New Way of Words."

1.63 To talk about awareness₂ is to use a pragmatic metalanguage. A pragmatic metalanguage includes a demantic metalanguage as a proper part, just a semantic metalanguage includes a syntactical metalanguage as a proper part.

1.631 One can talk in a pragmatic metalanguage about items being present to language users (minds) in many worlds.

1.6311 To talk about awareness₂ is not to be aware₂ of something.

1.632 To be aware₂ of something involves the use of a language, but it involves more than the use of a language. It involves something more than norm-conforming tokening. This something more is not norm-conforming. It is not a doing, but a

being confronted by the world. But of this more later.

1.7 The primitive symbols of a language, including primitive predicates and individual constants, find their materialization in basic token-classes, thus, to taken a tentative example, the shapes "red" and "bitter".

1.71 The language as a pure system of roles and norms consists of constructed roles and norms as well as primitive roles and norms. Two constructed expressions in a language may be logically equivalent. Thus 'Red & Bitter (x)' is L-equivalent to 'Red (x) & Bitter (x)'. The special quotation marks indicate that we are talking about the linguistic role which, in the first case, is played by the marks "Red & Bitter (x)"

1.711 Corresponding to the constructed type or role "Red & Bitter (x)" there will be in, say, the English materialization of the role, the constructed token-class "Red & Bitter (x)".

1.712 But there are among the norms of a language, and, in particular, among the specializations of the norms which constitute its materialization, as, say, English, norms which permit the replacement of certain constructed token-classes by defined token-classes. Thus, "Red & Bitter (x)" by "Ritter(x)", to coin an example, or, to take a familiar example, "Male & sibling (x)" by "brother (x)".

1.72 Thus, one may be aware of the "complex characteristic" brotherhood by having a mental token of either the token-class "brother" or the token-class "male & sibling".

1.73 By a simple token-class is meant a token-class which is not build (constructed) from other token-classes. A simple token-class is either a basic token-class or a defined token-class.

1.731 A complex token-class is a token-class which is not simple.

1.74 To be aware of something by means of a token of a simple token-class is to have a simple awareness. To be aware of something by means of a token of a complex token-class is to have a complex awareness. We could also speak of analysed and unanalysed awarenesses, taking them in the reverse order.

1.741 A crucial step in the phenomenology of phenomenology is to note that a simple awareness may be confused with the awareness of a simple. Here is the fons et origo of Gestalten.

1.7411 And of the paradox of analysis.

2. Phenomenology and empirical psychology.

211 Phenomenology is the exhibition of the norms of a language or region of a language by painstakingly and explicitly describing the structure of what one is conscious of in thinking about the subject-matter of the language. It is the exhibition of the norms of a language by the use of that language.

2.11 Phenomenology is rule-governed behavior enjoyed. Science is rule-governed behavior on trial. Phenomenology is contemplation, science is adventure.

2.12 In the phenomenology of morals, one exhibits the norms of ethical language by a painstaking description of what one is conscious of in thinking about the subject-matter of this language.

2.121 Thus, phenomenology corresponds at the linguistic level to the careful and reflective make-believe conformity to non-linguistic norms. It corresponds to the serious play-acting of duty. * * *

2.22 A norm is formulated by a rule. Awareness of a norm, then, is tokening the rule. But what psychological account can be given of this?

2.222 Normative activity is activity in which the rule formulating the norm... enters as a causal factor.

2.2221 The struggle between the "higher" and the "lower" self is exactly the struggle between Reason (rules) and Desire (certain causal factors other than rules).

2.2222 The features of a rule-sentence which indicate that it formulates a norm (the occurrence in it of "ought", "it is correct to", "it is not correct to", and other expressions of this type) express its causal rule in shaping behavior.

2.22221 This explains our dis-satisfaction with accounts of norms which make oughtness into a quality or relation. (1.3221)

2.223 The tokening of a rule is the phenomenological given-ness of ought.

2.224 A rule is not the rule of a person unless it is causally operative in his activity. Here is the sound core of Kant's Autonomy.

2.2241 When we say "You ought..." we are attempting to instigate a form of rule governed activity, either by bringing it about that the person addressed acquires ("learns") the rule, or that its causal force in his behavior is strengthened.

2.2242 When we say "You know you ought..." we affirm our belief in a community of rules.

2.32 Behaviorism is both a methodology and a psychological thesis.

2.321 As a methodologist, the Behaviorist conceives his task to be the elaboration of a system of concepts and laws in terms of which the observable behavior of organisms can be predicted and controlled.

2.322 The concepts he employs must be connected (1) by definition, and, in general, by the devices of logic and mathematics, (2) by axioms (formulated in the meta-language by P-rules), and by any combination of (1) and (2), with concepts relating to observable behavior.

2.3221 In short, the concepts of psychology, according to the behaviorist, must be related by explicit and/or implicit definitions to concepts relating to observable behavior.

2.323 Formulated in this way, Behaviorism is a more elastic methodological conception than many Behaviorists would allow. A narrower behaviorism would insist on restricting psychological concepts to those explicitly definable in terms of observable behavior.

2.3231 The prejudice in favor of restricting scientific concepts to those explicitly definable in terms of observables rests on a mistaken theory of concepts relating to observables. It rests on the illusion that these concepts (words) gain their meaning as concepts by association with observables.

2.3232 The truth of the matter is that all words have conceptual meaning by virtue of their role in a system of rule-governed behavior. All conceptual meaning is, in the last analysis, implicit definition.

2.3233 What, then, do "observation words" have that other words do not? The answer is that in addition to their conceptual meaning, these words are related in a non-rule-governed manner to environmental and intraorganic sensory stimuli.

2.32331 The tie-up between rule-governed language and the world is not itself rule-governed. (1.632)

2.323311 Could there be a rule "When X token 'X'"? No. To take account of (be conscious of) in a rule governed way is to token. Consequently, living up to this supposed rule would presuppose the occurrence of the token to be accounted for in terms of the rule.

2.323312 On the other hand, there could be the rule "When X, write (or shout) 'X'", for while taking account of X involves the tokening of 'X' or a synonym, this token is not the one which the rule says to produce.

2.324 Observation words are words whereby the world and he himself are present to (1.621) the user of the language.

2.3241 One and the same kind of utterance may serve both a rule-governed function (play a role in a language) and be a conditioned response to an external or internal stimulus.

2.3242 Conditioned responses can be surprisingly subtle responses to varying stimulus conditions.

2.3243 Observation expressions are expressions which play this dual role.../The noise "Daddie" was a conditioned response before it became a word, and observation word.7

2.33 The methodological behaviorist avoids the hasty identification of his concepts with neuro-physiological concepts: Nothing is gained by such identification as far as the content of psychological theory is concerned.

2.331 Nevertheless, something can be gained by cautious attempts along these lines. An attempted identification of a concept in psychology with a constructible concept in neuro-physiology may lead to a fruitful revision of the primitive terms

and axioms of psychological theory.

2.3311 After all, the language of psychology must sometime dovetail in some way with the language of neuro-physiology.

2.332 Yet the acceptability of a theory to the psychologist must lie in its success in coping with observable behavior. If it doesn't do this, then no matter how translatable it is into neuro-physiology, it isn't psychology.

2.34 Behaviorism as a psychological thesis (as contrasted with methodology) is the denial of consciousness. This denial, however, has been much misunderstood.

2.341 To deny consciousness in the sense in which the Behaviorist denies it, is to reject the traditional epistemologist's apparatus of mental acts. It is to deny the ultimacy of cognitive consciousness.

2.342 The sober Behaviorist does not deny that organisms have color sensations, etc., nor does he assert that color sensations are explicitly definable in terms of overt behavior.

2.3421 What the Behaviorist does deny is that there is any consciousness...that which isn't a matter of a...complicated learned system of stimulus-response connections of the sort that I should analyse by means of the concept of rule-governed behavior.

2.34211 In short, cognitive activity is overt and covert rule-governed behavior tied to the world by conditioned responses.

2.343 The Behaviorist rejects awarenesses of universals, of propositions, intentional acts, judgments etc., conceived as they have been by traditional epistemology. In rejecting these mythological entities, the Behaviorist continues the tradition of Hume and Mill, but without their mistaken belief that the laws of learning can be formulated in terms of sensations and images.

2.511 The psychologist who talks about a particular form of rule-governed behavior, say the moral conduct of a certain subject, must talk both about the kind of conduct in question and about the symbol behavior causally involved in the production of that conduct. Thus, one is tempted to say that he must talk both the language of the rule which governs the conduct of the subject, and the semantic metalanguage which describes the relation of the rule language to the non-linguistic realm, and in particular to the kind of conduct governed by the rule.

2.5111 Yet this is a dangerously misleading way of putting it. For (1) the language (conceptual frame) in which the ethical rules of the subject are stated need not be the psychologist's object-language (nor be capable of being translated into it); the psychologist who describes the conduct of the subject describes the conduct in his own language.

2.51111 The psychologist describing a form of conduct need not experience ought. On the other hand, he will be conscious of logical and physical necessities in his subject-matter, and of correct and incorrect in his thinking (use of language).

2.5112(2) The semantic metalanguage of the subject need not be the semantic metalanguage of the psychologist.

2.5113 But (3) -- the most important reason of all -- it is a mistake to say that the psychologist talks in a semantic metalanguage at all. To talk a semantic metalanguage is to talk about a system of norms and its being about a world. To use a semantic meta-language is to be conscious of a language as a system of norms, of oughts. The psychologist is conscious of norms only in the statistical sense of this dangerously ambiguous word.

2.512 The psychologist, then, talks and thinks in his object-language, even when he is talking (thinking) about language behavior, even about, say, syntactical metalanguage behavior.

2.513 We must distinguish carefully between "speaking a metalanguage" in the sense of being conscious of a system of linguistic roles and norms. The latter activity is the phenomenology of language, if reflectively and contemplatively indulged in. It is then Pure Semiotic.

2.514 The "idealization" involved in "constructing semantic systems" does not consist in supposin' that people talked in uniform ways, and formulating the empirical psychology of such a happy world. It is the "idealization" involved in the consciousness of a system of norms...

2.5141 This "idealization" admits of causal analysis by the psychologist, who will speak his object-language. The "idealization" consists in speaking a metalanguage. There is no contradiction, therefore in the idea of speaking about a metalanguage in an object-language.

* * *

3.4211 An assertion is a tokening of a sentence. To assert that p is to token a sentence designating p.

3.4211 An assertion is not an attitude which is capable of expression; it is not an attitude which is incapable of expression. It is not an attitude.

3.422 Legend has it that a mere utterance of a proposition is saying something like "Mary baking pies now", where as to assert a proposition is to say something like "Mary is baking pies now".

3.4221 But the truth of the matter is that "Mary baking pies now" is not a Milquetoastly uttered proposition at all, but rather a part of such sentences as "Mary baking pies now is actual (belongs to RS)", "Mary baking pies now is a complex state of affairs." Such sentences are in their very essence right hand sentences in a semantic metalanguage, and, therefore, are themselves parts of such sentences as

True ('Mary is baking pies now') \equiv Actual (Mary baking pies now)

Use-defined ('M is BPN') \equiv Complex-affairs (MBPN)

For further meditation on such sentences see 1.3222

3.4222 A belief manifests itself in assertions, emotions, actions. Degrees of belief can be characterized in terms of some ordering of the manifestations of beliefs. Readiness to wager at various odds is a commonly used principle.

3.4223 To believe p with intensity measure n is not the same as to think p probably to degree n. The former is to have a disposition of intensity measure n, one manifestation of which is to utter "p". The latter is to have a disposition (of some, unspecified, intensity measure) one manifestation of which is to utter "p is probable to degree n"...